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INTRODUCTION

We have all seen shows on channels like HGTV and the DIY Network
devoted to "tiny homes," including Tiny House Nation,' Tiny House
Hunters, 2 and Tiny Luxury.3 Inspired by desires to simplify finances, live a
minimalist lifestyle, and focus on relationships and experiences, tiny homes
are designed to be truly tiny, averaging about 186 square feet of living space,
roughly the size of a garage.4
Builders of tiny homes face many legal challenges, but perhaps the
greatest hurdles are constructing the home in compliance with local building
codes and finding a place where tiny houses are allowed.5 Building codes in
most municipalities set a minimum size for foundation-built homes,
effectively forcing tiny homes to be constructed on trailers, 6 which often
places them into the recreational vehicle (RV) category.' Zoning laws add to
the regulatory complexity, often restricting where a tiny home on wheels may
be placed.8
Although building a tiny home on wheels is a creative way to circumvent
building codes, doing so may have unintended consequences under the Fourth
Amendment, which protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures" 9
and generally requires police to obtain a warrant to search for evidence of

1.
Tiny
House Nation (Loud
Television
television
broadcast
2014),
http://www.fyi.tv/shows/tiny-house-nation.
2.
Tiny House Hunters (Pie Town Productions television broadcast 2014),
http://www.hgtv.com/shows/tiny-house-hunters/episodes.
3.
Tiny
Luxury
(Bodega
Pictures
television
broadcast
2015),
http://www.hgtv.com/shows/tiny-luxury/episodes.
4. See
Ryan Mitchell,
What Is the Tiny House Movement (2017),
http://thetinylife.com/what-is-the-tiny-house-movement [hereinafter Mitchell].
5.
See Teresa Mears, Could You Survive in 150 Square Feet? The Lowdown on Tiny
Homes, U.S. NEWS (June 18, 2015, 9:56 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/personalfinance/articles/2015/06/18/8-factors-to-consider-before-joining-the-tiny-house-movement;
see also Associated Press, Northeast Arkansas Town Restricts Tiny House Construction,
WASH. TIMES (June 21, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jun/21/northeastarkansas
-town-restricts-tiny-house-const/ (reporting that city officials in Jonesboro, Arkansas, recently
voted to restrict construction of homes less than 600 square feet because such small houses are
a fire hazard and can reduce adjacent property values).
6.
See JAY SHAFER, THE SMALL HOUSE BOOK 9 (2nd ed. 2010).
7.
See Mears, supra note 5; see also Katherine M. Vail, Saving the American Dream:
The Legalization ofthe Tiny House Movement, 54 U. LOUISVILLE L. REv. 357, 370 (2016).
8.
See Vail, supra note 7, at 370.

9.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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criminal wrongdoing.' 0 Americans have traditionally enjoyed the greatest
Fourth Amendment protection in their homes, a threshold which generally
may not be crossed without a warrant." Searches of automobiles and other
motor vehicles, however, often do not require prior judicial approval and may
be based on a police officer's own determination of probable cause.1 2 Because
tiny houses on wheels are readily mobile, full-time residences, this begs the
question yet unexplored by any court or scholar-of whether police may
search a tiny home on wheels without a warrant under the automobile
exception. This Article explores that issue.
Part II of this Article summarizes the so-called tiny house movement. Part
III considers zoning laws and building codes and examines their impact on the
construction and placement of tiny homes. Part IV summarizes the automobile
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, examining cases
involving motor homes, RVs, and trailers. Part V considers the automobile
exception's likely application to tiny houses and sets forth a proposal for
treating nearly all tiny houses alike under the Fourth Amendment. Part VI
concludes.
II.

THE TINY HOUSE MOVEMENT

The "tiny house movement" is a "social movement where people are
choosing to downsize the space they live in."' 3 The average size of a new
home built in 2014 was over 2,400 square feet. 14 By contrast, the typical tiny

10. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (stating the familiar principle
that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment -subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions") (emphasis added); see also Riley v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014).
11. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the heightened Fourth
Amendment protections in the home. E.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980)
(recognizing that "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed") (quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407
U.S. 297, 313 (1972)); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("'At the very core of
the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion.' With few exceptions, the question whether a
warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no."
(quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))).
12. See Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (listing the requirements of
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement as probable cause and ready mobility).
13. Mitchell, supra note 4.
14. Mears, supra note 5.
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house built on trailers, the focus of this Article, is about 200 square feet.' 5 Any
home between 500 and 1,000 square feet is considered "small," not "tiny."16
The concept of "living little" became more popular during the minimalist
craze of the early 2000s and gained traction during the recession as a way to
combat high mortgages, weekends spent on home repair and maintenance, and
the bitter reality that home values can fall quickly during economic
downturns.' 7

The typical tiny house costs between $45,000 and $80,000,18 and the
trend is to make them "bigger and fancier."1 9 Thus, tiny houses that are just
under 400 square feet and cost $70,000 or more are increasingly common. 20 In
general, however, a 180-square foot tiny home on wheels will cost around
$45,000 to construct, with about half of that cost spent on materials and about
half on labor. 2 1

Tiny homes are different from motor homes and RVs because they are
designed to look like a home built on a foundation, only smaller.22 In addition,
tiny homes, unlike motor homes and RVs, usually serve as someone's
permanent residence. 23 Moreover, although building standards exist for RVs,

15. There are different types of "tiny houses." This Article focuses on those that are
around 200 square feet, situated on wheels, and able to move from place to place. There are
also "tiny house 'eco-villages,' which are essentially communities of small houses clustered
together." Mears, supra note 5. Additionally, homes that are less than 1,000 square feet, built
in a traditional way, and intended to stay put are also considered part of the "tiny house
movement." Id.
16. Lukas I. Alpert, West Texas Town Finds 'Tiny House' Crowd a Bit Too Earthy,
WALL ST. J. (June 13, 2016, 9:22 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/west-texas-town-findstiny-house-crowd-a-bit-too-earthy- 1465867332.
17. Richard Reep, Florida's Tiny House Movement Embraces Some Big Ideas,
ORLANDO WEEKLY (Dec. 28, 2016), http://www.orlandoweekly.com/orlando/floridas-tinyhouse-movem
ent-embraces-some-big-ideas/Content?oid=2550158&showFullText=true.
18. See FAQs, TINY HOUSE COMMUNITY, http://www.tinyhousecommunity.com/faqs
/#what (last visited Oct. 19, 2017).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. (citing rangerfan213, What It Really Costs to Build a Tiny Home (Nov. 1, 2014),
https://rangerfan213.wordpress.com/2014/ 11/01/what-it-really-costs-to-build-a-tiny-home/).
22. Claudia Boyd-Barrett, Can Tiny Houses Help Solve Ventura County's Woes?,
VENTURA
CTY.
STAR
(Oct. 3, 2016, 3:00 PM), http://www.vcstar.com/story/
news/local/communities/2016/10/03/can-tiny-houses-help-solve-ventura-countys-woes/914952
96/; see SHAFER, supra note 6, at 18 (containing a photograph of a truck towing a typical tiny
home).
23. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 320.01(1)(b) (2017) (defining "motor vehicle" to include
"[a] recreational vehicle-type unit primarily designed as temporary living quarters for
recreational, camping, or travel use, which either has its own motive power or is mounted on
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residential homes on foundations, and manufactured homes,2 none of these
standards are fully applicable to the tiny home on wheels 25 (although a state or
municipality can deem them so, as in Minnesota, discussed below).
Although there is no official, legal definition of a "tiny house on wheels,"
according to a popular set of "Guidelines for Tiny Houses on Wheels," 26 a
"tiny house on wheels" is a structure which is intended as a full-time residence
or year-round rental property and meets the following five conditions:
(1) is built on a trailer registered with the builder's local DMV;
(2) is towable by a "bumper hitch, frame-towing hitch, or fifth-wheel
connection," such that it is incapable of moving and is not
designed to be moved under its own power;
(3) is typically "no more than 8'6" wide, 30' long, and 13'6" high"
(larger structures may require a commercial driver's license when
being towed);
(4) has between 70 and 400 square feet of interior living space
(excluding lofts); and
(5) accommodates normal daily activities, such as cooking and
sleeping. 27
In short, a tiny home is designed to serve as a full-time residence; yet, it
may also be moved from place to place by a vehicle capable of towing it. 28
Thus, if a tiny home dweller wants to spend his summer visiting Alaska, 29

or drawn by another vehicle," an example of which is the "motor home," which is defined as
"a vehicular unit which . . is a self-propelled motor vehicle . . primarily designed to provide
temporary living quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use").
24. Elaine Walker, Guidelines for Tiny Houses on Wheels (THOWs), TINY HOUSE
COMMUNITY, http://www.tinyhousecommunity.com/guidelines-for-thow/ (last visited Oct. 10,
2017); see generally TINY HOUSES CODE FACT SHEET, MINN. DEP'T OF LAB. AND INDUS.,
https://www.dli.mn.gov/ccld/PDF/tinyhouses.pdf [hereinafter CODE FACT SHEET].
25. See CODE FACT SHEET, supra note 24 (describing the requirements for tiny houses
on wheels separately from those without); see also Walker, supra note 24.
26. According to the author of the Guidelines for Tiny Houses on Wheels, these
guidelines "are not recognized by any government authority" and are designed to help
establish standards that might later be adopted by agencies when creating new zoning or code
regulations for tiny houses. Walker, supra note 24.
27. Id.
28. See SHAFER, supra note 6, at 18 (containing a photograph of a truck towing a
typical tiny home).
29. See Elise Giordano, Tiny House Trailers Considered Recreational Vehicles,
SKAGWAY NEWS (Feb. 18, 2016), http://skagwaynews.com/2016/02/18/tiny-house-trailersconsidered-recreational-vehicles/ (reporting that Skagway Borough, Alaska "assembly
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California, 30 Texas, 3' Florida,32 Colorado, 33 and Indiana, 34 he may do so if he
has a vehicle capable of transporting his home and finds locations in those
states where tiny homes are allowed.
Because zoning laws and building codes effectively dictate where most
tiny home dwellers will choose to locate their home and how they will
construct it, 35 the next Part examines trends in housing regulations as they
pertain to the tiny house movement.
III. ZONING LAWS, BUILDING CODES, AND HOUSING REGULATIONS

Although growing in popularity, tiny home living is complicated by the
legal hurdles that must be overcome to construct a tiny house. Building a tiny
home on a foundation is often risky due to building codes and zoning laws,
which generally prohibit residences below a certain minimum square
footage. 36 For this reason, most tiny home builders initially used "legal
loopholes" to make tiny home living a reality, including building homes on
trailers to evade minimum square footage requirements for foundation-built
homes. 37 However, in recent years, advocates of the tiny house movement
have been working to "change the law[] rather than evade it." 38 After

members passed the first reading of an ordinance that permits tiny house trailers as recreational
vehicles where RVs are currently allowed").
30. See Ramona Giwargis, San Jose: New Law Would Make City First to Allow "Tiny
Homes "for Homeless, MERCURY NEWS (Oct. 7, 2016) (reporting changes to laws in San Jose,
California, that allow tiny homes for the homeless).
31. See Alpert, supra note 16 (stating that the "relaxed building codes" in certain areas
of Texas make tiny homes appealing).
32. See Reep, supra note 17.
33. See Lloyd Alter, Finally! Tiny Home Subdivisions and Developments are Becoming
a Reality, TREEHUGGER (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.treehugger.com/tiny-houses/finallytiny-home-subdivisions-and-developments-are-becoming-reality.html (reporting a change in
zoning code restrictions on houses less than 600 square feet to permit tiny homes in the town
of Walsenburg, Colorado).
34. See Jeff Parrott, Will Tiny House Movement Make a Big Impact in South Bend?,
SOUTH BEND TRIBUNE (Dec. 11, 2016), http://www.southbendtribune.com/news/local/
will-tiny-house-movement-make-a-big-impact-in-south/article_55ef082c-5f71-5bdc-9080-203
ee89b7856.html (contemplating a tiny house subdivision in South Bend, Indiana).
35. See Vail, supra note 7, at 372-73 (discussing how tiny home dwellers must find
loopholes to circumvent various building codes and zoning laws).
36. Id. at 365 (stating that zoning laws regulating the minimum amount of floor space in
housing effectively exclude tiny homes from most residential neighborhoods).
37. See, e.g., SHAFER, supra note 6, at 9-10 (describing the author's experience evading
housing regulations).
38. Vail, supra note 7, at 358.
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summarizing traditional housing regulations, including zoning laws and
building codes, this Section examines those efforts, and subsequent sections
show how housing regulations may inadvertently impact a tiny home owner's
Fourth Amendment rights.
A.

Zoning Laws

Housing regulations in America include both zoning laws and building
codes.39 Zoning laws date back to the early 1900s and are used today to
manage the development and use of land by creating different zones and
regulating the use and construction of property allowed in each zone. 40
In 1926, the United States Supreme Court held that the passage of zoning
laws is a constitutional exercise of a government's police powers to promote
health, safety, morals, and the general welfare. 41 In that case, the Court
recognized that one of the basic elements of zoning is the classification of land
by permissible use. 42 Common permissible uses today include residential,
containing buildings for human habitation; commercial, where businesses are
located; agricultural, encompassing lands used for farming; industrial,
including manufacturing, shipping, and transportation; and conservation, such
as areas dedicated to soil and water preservation. 43 A city's districts may be
further divided into sub-districts. A residential district, for example, may be
divided into sub-districts separating low-density (single-family homes with
large lots), high-density (single- and multiple-family homes with small lots),
and planned-unit structures (condominiums or apartments).
Since 1928, the Supreme Court has rarely held that a zoning measure
exceeds the police power. 44 As a result, the primary responsibility for
regulating zoning laws resides with the states, which have generally delegated

39. See Georgette Chapman Phillips, An Urban Slice of Apple Pie: Rethinking
Homeownership in U.S. Cities, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 187, 191-92
(2010); see also Sara C. Galvan, Rehabilitating Rehab Through State Building Codes, 115
YALE L.J. 1744, 1746 (2006) (discussing building codes).
40. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
41. Id. at 386-97.
42. Id. at 388.
43. See Eric Damian Kelly, FairHousing, Good Housing or Expensive Housing? Are
Building Codes Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 349,
352 (1996) (stating that common land use classifications include residential, commercial,
industrial, and agricultural uses); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-29-710(A)(5) (2004) (stating that a
zoning ordinance must be made for certain purposes, including, but not limited to,
conservation).
44. The Legitimate Objectives of Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1443, 1443 (1978)
[hereinafter Legitimate Objectives].
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the zoning power to municipalities.4 5 Municipalities' zoning rules govern
more than permissible uses of land. 46 In residential districts, for example, an
ordinance may regulate matters such as lot size and height. 47 Importantly for
the tiny house movement, zoning ordinances usually set minimum square
footage requirements, often in the range of 500 to 1,500 square feet. 48 These

'

zoning ordinances serve various purposes, including preserving land values,
preventing overcrowding, fostering the general health of the community's
occupants, and preserving a community's character. 49 Jurisdictions may also
require minimum lot sizes, which can pose a problem for those wishing to live
in a tiny home.5o Although there are exceptions, square footage and lot size
requirements effectively make tiny homes constructed on a foundation illegal
5
in most jurisdictions.
To circumvent traditional building requirements, builders of tiny homes
often construct their homes on trailers. 52 However, doing so does not
necessarily make a tiny home lawful. For example, in 2015, in St. Cloud,
Minnesota, the St. Cloud Zoning Board of Appeals denied a church's request
to allow a tiny house to be used to house homeless persons on church
grounds. 53 In rejecting the church's permit, the St. Cloud Zoning Board of
Appeals found that the tiny home, which had been built on a trailer, most

45. Id. at 1443-44; Galvan, supra note 39, at 1746.
46. See Legitimate Objectives, supra note 44, at 1444 (recognizing that municipalities
have more than one objective that they may pursue through zoning).
47. Vail, supra note 7, at 362; see also Legitimate Objectives, supra note 44, at 144546.
48. See Builders Serv. Corp., Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of Town of E.
Hampton, 545 A.2d 530, 540 n.13 (Conn. 1988) (setting forth minimum square footage
requirements in over 150 Connecticut municipalities); see also CODE FACT SHEET, supra note
24 (stating that "minimum building size varies from areas of 500 to 2,000 square feet"); cf
Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Twp., 89 A.2d 693, 698 (N.J. 1952) (upholding minimum floor
space requirements of 768 square feet for a one-story dwelling; 1,000 square feet for a twostory dwelling with an attached garage; and 1,200 square feet for a two-story dwelling without
an attached garage).
49. See Lionshead Lake, 89 A.2d at 697.
50. See id. at 697-98; see also Rebecca Thiele, Kalamazoo's First Tiny House May
Change Housing Laws, WMUK (Sept. 16, 2016), http://wmuk.org/post/kalamazoo-s-first-tinyhouse-may-change-housing-laws (reporting that foundation-built homes in Kalamazoo,
Michigan, may be as small as 120 square feet, but the municipality's minimum lot sizes could
pose a problem for residents wishing to reside in a tiny home within the city).
51. See Vail, supra note 7, at 365.
52. See, e.g., SHAFER, supra note 6, at 9.
53. Frank Rajkowski, Tiny House Sits Empty as Search for Solution Continues, ST.
CLOUD TIMES (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.sctimes.com/story/news/local/2015/09/18/tinyhouse-sits-empty-search-solution-continues/72419484/.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss2/2

8

McAllister: Go Tiny or Go Home: How Living Tiny May Inadvertently Reduce Priv
Go TINY OR Go HOME

2017]

273

closely resembled an RV and therefore could not be used as a full-time
residence under the city's zoning laws.5 4 Deeming the matter a legislative
concern, St. Cloud Zoning Board of Appeals Chairman Drew Hultgren
declared that "[u]nless the [city's zoning ordinance] changes,. . . we couldn't
approve it."

As the St. Cloud example illustrates, even when tiny homes are built on
wheels to circumvent minimum square footage requirements, the homes may
still be illegal if they fail to comply with requirements applicable to other
analogous structures. Thus, a tiny home builder does not necessarily satisfy
zoning requirements by building a home on a trailer.
B.

Building Codes

Along with zoning laws, building codes usually impact the construction of
tiny houses.56 As with zoning laws, the power to draft building codes resides
with the states, which have generally delegated that power to local
governments. 7 Building codes in the United States have evolved from a short
set of rules constituting a few sentences to complex sets of documents filling
hundreds of pages." Today, approximately 10,000 jurisdictions in the United
States have a traditional building code.5 9
Building codes control the construction of buildings and are designed to
ensure that buildings are safe, sanitary, convenient, and efficient.6 0 As such,
building codes typically set forth technical requirements that are drafted by
industry experts to ensure a minimum standard of quality and safety.61
"Narrowly defined, 'building codes' address the structure of buildings,"
while "[s]upplemental codes address such issues as plumbing and electrical
systems." 62 Numerous model building codes exist, 63 such as the International

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Kelly, supra note 43, at 350.
57. Galvan, supra note 39, at 1747.
58. Kelly, supra note 43, at 349.
59. Galvan, supra note 39, at 1747.
60. Kelly, supra note 43, at 349.
61. Galvan, supra note 39, at 1747.
62. See Kelly, supra note 43, at 354.
63. Id. at 350-51 (listing regional model building codes, including, among others, "the
Uniform Building Code, developed by the International Congress of Building Officials
(ICBO); the Basic Building Code ([BOCA]), developed by the Building Officials Conference
of America; the Southern Standard Building Code, prepared by the Southern Building Code
Congress; and the National Building Code, offered by the American Insurance Association");
see also Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l Inc., 241 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting
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Building Code (IBC), which have greatly influenced local building laws. 6 4 In
jurisdictions with a building code, a "building code administrator," or
someone with a similar title, implements the code. 65
Manufactured homes, or mobile homes, add to the complexity of zoning
laws and building codes. 66 Municipalities often discourage manufactured
homes because they can be perceived as eye sores that attract undesirable
inhabitants.67 Some older manufactured homes also came with extreme safety
risks, such as highly flammable materials. 68 For the past few decades,
however, most new manufactured homes have been subject to standards
established by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), 69 such that many of these homes are built with the types of
technologies often used to build more traditional homes. 70 Finally, although
most mobile homes today contain 1,400 or more square feet, 7' they are usually
easily identifiable as manufactured homes and are subject to their own unique
set of HUD standards.72
C.

Tiny House Regulations

Tiny houses, like all other houses, must comply with applicable zoning
laws and building codes. 73 Because the tiny house movement is relatively
new, only a handful of municipalities have expressly amended their zoning
laws to specifically account for the tiny home. 74 Accordingly, in most
jurisdictions, housing officials and prospective homeowners face great

that several towns in North Texas have adopted building codes published by Southern
Building Code Congress International).
64. See 5 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O'CONNOR JR., BRUNER & O'CONNOR ON
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 16:2, 5 n.11 (2017) (describing the various model building codes and

their adoption by state and local governments).
65. Kelly, supra note 43, at 352.
66. Id at 354.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 2 U.S.C. § 5403(d) (2012); Kelly, supra note 43, at 354-55; Office Manufactured
Housing Programs, U.S. DEP'T Hous. & URBAN DEV., https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?
src=/program offices/housing/rmra/mhs/mhshome (last visited Nov. 7, 2017).
70. Kelly, supranote 43, at 354-55.
71. Id at 355.
72. Id at 354-55.
73. CODE FACT SHEET, supra note 24.
74. See, e.g., BRILEY TOWNSHIP, MICH., ZONING ORDINANCE §§ 201, 500 (2015)
(containing the zoning ordinance of Briley Township, Michigan, which now permits an
"economy efficient dwelling," which is a dwelling of between 240 and 500 square feet that is
placed on a permanent foundation).
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uncertainty when attempting to categorize the tiny house, which is necessary
to determine applicable building standards and zoning laws. 7 5
Because the typical tiny home has characteristics of traditional homes
built on foundations (as to its aesthetics and amenities), RVs (as to its
mobility), and manufactured homes (as to its prefabricated manner of
construction), in jurisdictions where building codes have not been amended to
specifically account for the tiny home, tiny homes might be deemed to fall into
any of those categories, so it is difficult to know in advance what rules
apply. 76 The Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry (Minnesota Labor
Department) recently issued a "Code Fact Sheet" to provide guidance on this
very issue in Minnesota. 7 7

According to the Code Fact Sheet, a tiny home may fall into one of
several distinct categories of structures depending on a host of variables,
including whether the particular tiny home is built on a chassis with wheels,
whether it is intended to provide permanent or temporary living quarters,
whether it is site-built or prefabricated, and its square footage.7 1
The Minnesota State Building Code governs the construction and use of
buildings in the State of Minnesota.79 As part of the Building Code, Minnesota
also has a statewide "Residential Code," called the "2015 Minnesota

75. See Brynn Grimley, Steilacoom Family's Tiny Housing Choice Raises Big Question
About Size, NEWS TRIBUNE (Aug. 15, 2016, 7:00 PM), http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/
local/article95866897.html (describing the uncertainty surrounding the regulation of tiny
homes in Washington); see generally CODE FACT SHEET, supra note 24 (attempting to help
tiny home owners navigate the zoning and building code uncertainties of owning a tiny home).
76. See Grimley, supra note 75 (describing the uncertainty surrounding the regulation of
tiny homes in Washington and reporting on one Washington county that classifies a tiny home
on wheels as an RV); Brian Perry, Ideas to Increase Maui County's Affordable Housing
Inventory Offered, MAUI NEWS (Oct. 8, 2016), http://www.mauinews.com/uncategorized/
2016/10/ideas-to-increase-maui-countys-affordable-housing-inventory-offered/
(noting the
report of a Maui County Council investigative group stating that "[i]t is unclear how tiny
homes with wheels are treated for purposes of the building and zoning codes" and
recommending comprehensive rezoning by the Maui County Council to make tiny homes
lawful).
77.

CODE FACT SHEET, supra note 24.

78. Id.
79. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 326B.101-.16 (West 2013).
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'

Residential Code," 0 which itself contains detailed provisions governing the
construction of single-family dwellings. 8
As a starting point, the Minnesota Labor Department posits that a tiny
house meets the definition of "dwelling" under the 2015 Minnesota
Residential Code,8 2 making its provisions applicable, including its minimum
square footage requirements.8 3 The Minnesota Residential Code, in tum,
requires every dwelling unit to "have at least one habitable room [of] not less
than 120 square feet," adding that "[o]ther habitable rooms shall have a floor
area of not less than 70 square feet." 84 Unlike some housing codes, these
particular square footage minimums likely do not pose a problem for many
tiny homes. 5 However, because tiny homes in Minnesota might also be
subject to other sets of standards-for example, those pertaining to
prefabricated buildings they could potentially still be illegal, as is true in
other jurisdictions. 86
According to the Minnesota Labor Department, a tiny home constructed
on site is subject only to the requirements of the 2015 Minnesota Residential
Code. 7 By contrast, "tiny houses built on a chassis with wheels" could be
classified as a "recreational park trailer," which is governed by a distinct set of
building standards." However, if a tiny home on wheels is intended as a
permanent living dwelling unit, as most tiny homes are, the 2015 Minnesota
Residential Code would govern. 89

80. MINN. R. 1309.0010-.0905 (2017); Builders Ass'n of Twin Cities v. Minn. Dep't of
Labor & Indus., 872 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015) (stating that the Minnesota
Residential Code is part of the Building Code); see CODE FACT SHEET, supra note 24
(providing an overview of the 2015 Minnesota Building Code).
81. The Minnesota State Building Code adopts by reference portions of the 2012
International Residential Code. MINN. R. 1309.0010 (2017); see CODE FACT SHEET, supra
note 24 (discussing the 2015 Minnesota Building Code).
82. The Minnesota Residential Code defines "dwelling," in pertinent part, to include
"[a]ny building that contains one dwelling unit . .
designed to be . . occupied for living

purposes." MINN. R. 1309.0202 (2017).
83.
84.

CODE FACT SHEET, supra note 24.
Vail, supra note 7, at 372 (quoting INT'L RESIDENTIAL CODE § R304.1 (INT'L CODE

COUNCIL 2015) (incorporated by reference in MINN. R. 1309.0010 (2017))).
85. See Vail, supra note 7, at 372 (stating that local codes are likely a greater obstacle
than the International Residential Code).
86. See, e.g., Vail, supra note 7, at 372-73 (recognizing that most tiny homes are
factory built and would be illegal in Louisville, Kentucky, due to applicable square footage
and permanent foundation requirements).
87. CODE FACT SHEET, supra note 24.

88.
89.

Id.
Id.
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The 2015 Minnesota Residential Code likewise pertains to dwellings
constructed as prefabricated buildings, which again includes most tiny
homes; 90 however, such prefabricated buildings must also satisfy the
requirements for prefabricated homes set forth in either Chapter 1360 or 1361
of the Minnesota Rules, 91 depending on the number of prefabricated homes a
particular manufacturer constructs in a given calendar year. 92 Finally, a tiny
home, depending on its size and manner of construction, could qualify as a
HUD "manufactured home," thereby triggering the usual HUD requirements
for such homes. 93

Although tiny home builders in Minnesota no doubt appreciate the
Minnesota Labor Department's guidance regarding how tiny homes will be
regulated, this dizzying array of classifications and standards illustrates the
difficulty some persons, including law enforcement, encounter when
attempting to place a given tiny home into a traditional structural category.
And of course, zoning laws may also impact the lawfulness of tiny homes,
which is particularly true in Minnesota, where municipalities such as St. Cloud
have deemed tiny homes on wheels essentially unlawful under local zoning
laws (even if the tiny home otherwise complies with applicable building
standards). 94
When zoning laws do pose a problem for the tiny home dweller,
individual homeowners may seek a variance, which is essentially an exception
to zoning rules made on a case-by-case basis. 95 Some municipalities,
sympathetic to the tiny house movement, have made changes to their zoning
laws specifically allowing variances to the municipality's minimum floor area

90. Id
91. Id
92. Id See MINN. R. 1360.0100 (2017) (stating that the chapter of the rules is intended
to govern the construction of prefabricated buildings for manufacturers who produce three or
less prefabricated buildings in a calendar year).
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 5402 (2012) (defining a manufactured home); id. § 5404 (providing
standards for manufactured home installation).
94. See ST. CLOUD, MINN., LAND DEV. CODE art. 14.3.H.1 (2014); see, e.g., SHAFER,
supra note 6, at 15 (explaining how the author sidestepped building codes in Iowa City by
building his tiny home on wheels only to discover additional zoning laws impacting where he
could locate the home); Katie Moore, Some Tiny Houses Not Allowed as Residences in
Topeka, TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL (Nov. 15, 2016), http://cjonline.com/news/2016-1115/some-tiny-houses-not-allowed-residences-topeka (reporting that tiny homes in Topeka,
Kansas, must be built on a permanent foundation to be lawful).
95. See Nathan T. Boone, Varying the Variance: How New York City Can Solve Its
Housing Crisis and Optimize Land Use to Serve the Public Interest, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 837,
839 (2016) (noting that variances create exceptions to zoning restrictions when economic
necessity demands it).
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requirements. The City of Walsenburg, Colorado, for example, has adopted
ordinances designed to make tiny homes lawful by explicitly authorizing the
city's planning commission to consider variances to the minimum floor area
required for homes located in certain residential districts within the city.
However, to obtain such a variance, the dwelling must be permanently placed
on a footer or foundation and separately connected to the city's water and
sewer system. 96
Although the City of Walsenburg likely did not consider the Fourth
Amendment implications of its rules at the time, due to the foundation and
utilities requirements described above, tiny homes in Walsenburg almost
certainly enjoy the same Fourth Amendment protections pertaining to all
homes namely the full protection of warrants. However, this is not always
the case, especially as to tiny homes built on wheels that could be considered
"vehicles" rather than "homes" under the Fourth Amendment. 97
Along with variances, some municipalities have taken a more proactive
approach by amending their zoning laws and building codes to make tiny
homes categorically lawful. For example, Coconino County, Arizona, has
plans to amend its building code to allow tiny homes within the
municipality.98 Although not this Article's focus, the county's proposed
revisions provide an excellent example of a building code specifically
designed for tiny homes. 99 Of particular importance to this Article, however, is
the fact that tiny homes in Coconino County can be built either on trailers or
foundations,'o thereby squarely presenting the issue of whether, as part of a
criminal investigation, police may search a particular tiny home in Coconino
County without a warrant pursuant to the automobile exception, a topic
addressed below.
IV.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and

96. E.g., Walsenburg, Colo., Ordinance No. 1045 (Sept. 2, 2014), http://docs.wix
static.com/ugd/1615ec_3abcddOd5b964a4daOdd22eb33976bf7.pdf
97. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985) (characterizing a motor home as
a "vehicle" and holding that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement does not apply).
98. COCONINO CTY. ARIZ. CMTY. DEV., PERMITTING REGULATIONS FOR TINY HOUSES
IN COCONINO COUNTY (Aug. 19, 2016), http://coconino.az.gov/DocumentCenter/View/17693
[hereinafter COCONINO].

99. See id.
100. Id.
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seizures" and generally requires police to obtain a warrant to search for
evidence of criminal wrongdoing.' 0 ' Partly due to the explicit protection of
"houses" in the Fourth Amendment's text, Americans have traditionally
enjoyed the greatest Fourth Amendment protection in their homes, a threshold
that generally may not be crossed without a warrant.1 02 Although searches of
the home may occur without a warrant in limited instances,1 03 outside the
home, the Fourth Amendment's so-called warrant requirement is subject to
numerous exceptions, including, but not limited to, consent,1 04 searches
incident to arrest, 105 stop and frisk searches,1 06 and searches performed for
administrative reasons. 107
A.

The Automobile Exception Applied to Cars

Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, police may
search a vehicle 's without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe the

101. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)
(stating the familiar principle that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendmentsubject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions") (emphasis
added); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014).
102. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the heightened Fourth
Amendment protections in the home. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001)
("At the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. With few exceptions, the
question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must
be answered no.") (internal citations and marks omitted); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
585 (1980) (recognizing that "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed").
103. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011) (discussing the most common
exigencies that may justify a warrantless search of a home).
104. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
105. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
106. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (authorizing the temporary seizure of a
person suspected of committing a crime on the basis of reasonable suspicion, rather than
probable cause, and further authorizing a limited search for weapons where police have reason
to believe the person may be armed).
107. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (recognizing that persons
and property may be searched without a warrant or probable cause upon entry into the United
States).
108. Notably, the automobile exception extends to more than automobiles capable of
functioning on the highway. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925)
(distinguishing a search of a "store, dwelling house, or other structure," which generally
requires a warrant, from a search of a "ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile," each of which
"can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
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vehicle contains evidence of a crime and the vehicle is "readily mobile."' 09
Importantly for the tiny house movement, the "readily mobile" requirement is
not stringent, merely requiring that a vehicle be capable of functioning as
such a standard that is easily met.
1.

The "ReadilyMobile" Requirement

Since 1925, the United States Supreme Court has decided numerous
automobile exception cases. "o In its early cases, the Court vacillated between
a true "mobility" concern that requires an actual risk of losing valuable
evidence if police are required to obtain a warrant to search a vehicle that may
be quickly driven away"' and a far more relaxed "mobility" standard that
considers merely whether a vehicle is capable of operation, regardless of
whether there is any meaningful chance the vehicle could be moved during the
warrant application process.11 2 Today, the latter view has prevailed." 3 Thus,
as long as a vehicle is capable of operation and probable cause exists to search
it, police may search the vehicle without a warrant. 114
In the Court's first automobile exception case, Carroll v. United States,
police had probable cause to search a car stopped on the highway but could
not arrest the vehicle's occupants until the officers actually observed the
bootleg liquor they believed was hidden in the vehicle.' '1 Under these
circumstances, had a warrant been required, the car could have been "quickly

sought"); see also United States v. Hill, 855 F.2d 664, 668 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying the
automobile exception to a houseboat).
109. See Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) ("If a car is readily mobile
and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus
permits police to search the vehicle without more.").
110. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1985) (tracing the history of the
exception).
111. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 459-62 (1971); Carroll, 267 U.S. at
153; see also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 61-65 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the argument that a vehicle may be searched without a warrant where there is no real
danger that the vehicle will be moved out of the jurisdiction in the short time necessary to
obtain a warrant).
112. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 393 (describing the "mobility" requirement as "readily
mobile by the turn of an ignition key, if not actually moving").
113. See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67 (1999) ("[U]nder our established
precedent, the 'automobile exception' has no separate exigency requirement."); Labron, 518
U.S. at 940 (rejecting the requirement of an exigency to search a car without a warrant); Cady
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973) (commenting on the lack of any exigency in
several of the Court's automobile exception cases).
114. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 392-93.
115. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 159-62.
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moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought."" 6 Thus, the Court determined that police could immediately search
the vehicle on the highway solely on the basis of probable cause." 7
Significantly, however, the Court stated that where it is "reasonably
practicable" to secure a warrant prior to searching a car, one should be
obtained." 8
Although the Carroll ruling was grounded in the vehicle's capability of
being quickly removed from the jurisdiction where a warrant might be
obtained, arguably establishing a true exigency requirement,11 9 the Court's
more recent cases make clear that no such exigency is required. 120 In
Chambers v. Maroney, for example, the Court held that a vehicle was properly
searched without a warrant, pursuant to the automobile exception, while it was
secured at a police station with its occupants safely behind bars.121 Unlike in
Carroll, where police could not make an arrest until after the car was
searched, in Chambers, officers had probable cause to immediately arrest the
vehicle's occupants.1 22 Further, police searched the Chambers vehicle only
after towing it from the highway, securing the vehicle, and arresting its
occupants.1 23 As such, the officers arguably should have been required to
obtain a warrant prior to conducting the search because there was no real
danger that the Chambers automobile or any evidence inside would disappear
while a warrant was sought.1 24 Nevertheless, the Court upheld the search.1 25
Emphasizing the "reasonableness" of the warrantless search, the Chambers
majority stated that the vehicle "could have been searched on the [highway]

116. Id at 153.
117. See id. at 155-57.
118. Id. at 156 ("In cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it
must be used and when properly supported by affidavit and issued after judicial approval
protects the seizing officer against a suit for damages. In cases where seizure is impossible
except without warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and at his peril unless he can show
the court probable cause.") (citing U.S. v. Kaplan, 286 F. 963, 972 (S.D. Ga. 1923)); see also
Carney, 471 U.S. at 401 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (endorsing this view).
119. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460 (1971) (endorsing this view of
Carroll).
120. See Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (rejecting the exigency
requirement for searches conducted under the automobile exception); United States v. Johns,
469 U.S. 478, 484 (1985) (citing Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (rejecting the
exigency requirement for searches conducted under the automobile exception)).
121. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47-52 (1970).
122. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 46.
123. Id. at 44.
124. See id. at 51.
125. Id. at 52.
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when it was stopped since there was probable cause to search and it was a
fleeting target for a search."1 26 According to Justice White, who authored the
Chambers opinion, probable cause was still present at the station house and
"so [was] the mobility of the car," making the automobile exception
applicable. 127
Through its holding, the Chambers Court effectively treated functioning
automobiles as inherently mobile-even while impounded at the police
station making the vehicle searchable upon probable cause alone. The Court
reversed course, but only briefly, in another automobile exception case
decided just one year later-Coolidgev. New Hampshire.128
In Coolidge, police arrested a man at his home and, without a valid search
warrant, seized the car parked in his driveway, towed it to the police station,
and searched it two days later, again a year later, and again a few months after
that.1 29 Evidence obtained from the car was then admitted against Coolidge,
leading to his conviction. 3 0 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the State
invoked the automobile exception and argued, pursuant to Chambers, that
whenever police may search a vehicle on the highway under Carroll, they
may also seize the vehicle and search it later at the police station. 131 The Court
rejected the State's argument because, in the majority's view, "application of
the Carroll case to these facts would extend it far beyond its original
rationale." 3 2 According to the Court, unlike Carroll, and to some extent
Chambers, where the opportunity to search was "fleeting," it was not in
Coolidge.1" Specifically, Coolidge was arrested inside his house and could
not have gained access to the automobile. 34 Also, police had removed
Coolidge's wife from the home and told her she could not use the subject
vehicle, after which they guarded the Coolidge property throughout the

126. Id
127. Id Although the majority's reasoning on this point is somewhat unclear, the
Supreme Court in Coolidge later described the holding of Chambers as follows:
"Chambers . . held only that, where the police may stop and search an automobile under
Carroll, they may also seize it and search it later at the police station." Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 463 (1971).
128. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 453 (finding invalid a warrant authorizing the vehicle search
because the warrant had been issued not to a neutral and detached magistrate, as the Fourth
Amendment requires, but by the Attorney General, who was to be chief prosecutor at the trial).
129. Id. at 447-49.
130. Id. at 448.
131. Id. at 458.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 460.
134. Id.
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night.' 35 For these reasons, the Court emphasized that the case involved "no
alerted criminal bent on flight, no fleeting opportunity [to search] on an open
highway after a hazardous chase, no contraband or stolen goods or weapons,
no confederates waiting to move the evidence, not even the inconvenience of a
special police detail to guard the immobilized [vehicle]." 3 6 Accordingly, the
automobile exception was deemed "irrelevant."1 37
Reflecting his desire to treat all functioning automobiles alike for Fourth
Amendment purposes, Justice White, who authored Chambers, wrote a dissent
in which he declared that "the difference between a moving and movable
vehicle is tenuous at best."1 38 He therefore urged the Court, "in the interest of
coherence and credibility," to either "treat automobiles precisely as we do
houses or apply th[e] [automobile exception] to readily movable as well as
moving vehicles . . . ."13 In Justice White's view, as long as a vehicle is
capable of operation, nothing more than probable cause should be required to
search it. 140
Despite these early disagreements regarding the meaning of mobility,
Justice White's relaxed view of mobility has since been routinely endorsed. 141
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, recently stated that the
automobile exception's "readily mobile" requirement "has more to do with the
inherent mobility of the vehicle than with the potential for the vehicle to be

135. Id at 460-61.
136. Id at 462.
137. Id
138. Id. at 537 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
139. Id
140. See id.
141. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (merely requiring vehicle to be
"readily capable" of use on the highway); United States v. Howard, 489 F.3d 484, 493 (2d Cir.
2007) (rejecting the defendants' argument that their vehicles were not "readily mobile"
because they were in police custody and stating, "[w]hether a vehicle is 'readily mobile'
within the meaning of the automobile exception has more to do with the inherent mobility of
the vehicle than with the potential for the vehicle to be moved from the jurisdiction .... );
Collins v. Commonwealth, 790 S.E.2d 611, 618 (Va. 2016) (recognizing that "[a] vehicle's
inherent mobility not the probability that it might actually be set in motion-is the
foundation of the automobile exception's mobility rationale") (quoting United States v. Smith,
456 F. App'x 200, 209 (4th Cir. 2011)); cf Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999)
("[W]here there [i]s probable cause to search a vehicle 'a search is not unreasonable if based
on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not been
actually obtained' ..... In this case, the [lower court] found that there was 'abundant probable
cause' that the car contained contraband. This finding alone satisfies the automobile exception
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement .... ) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 809 (1982)) (emphasis in the original).
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moved from the jurisdiction,"1 42 adding that "[e]ven where there is little
practical likelihood that [a] vehicle will be driven away"-as in a case where
the vehicle's occupants are detained by police-the exception still applies. 143
Thus, under today's law, all functioning automobiles satisfy the automobile
exception's mobility requirement, leaving only an officer's own determination
of probable cause as a barrier to such a search, a notion of mobility that has
potentially profound implications for the tiny home on wheels.1 44
2.

The Lesser Expectation ofPrivacyRationale

Given the differing conceptions of mobility, particularly as between
Chambers (decided in 1970) and Coolidge (decided in 1971), the Court later
determined that the automobile exception should be grounded in a different
rationale, namely that vehicles enjoy relatively reduced expectations of
privacy as compared to homes, thereby justifying their warrantless search.1 45
This additional rationale effectively makes the lack of any mobility-based
exigency essentially irrelevant in any given automobile exception case.1 46
The Supreme Court has identified several factors that collectively reduce
the expectation of privacy in automobiles, emphasizing the "pervasive and
continuing governmental regulation" of vehicles as the primary factor.1 47 In
addition, the Court has noted that a vehicle's "function is transportation and it

142. Howard, 489 F.3d at 493 (emphasis added).
143. Id.
144. See United States v. Navas, 597 F.3d 492, 497-98 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that the
automobile exception "permits law enforcement to conduct a warrantless search of a readily
mobile vehicle where there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband"
and stating that, "a vehicle's inherent mobility not the probability that it might actually be set
in motion-is the foundation of the mobility rationale") (first citing Pennsylvania v. Labron,
518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996); then citing Howard, 489 F.3d at 493); United States v. McKreith,
708 F. Supp. 2d 216, 225 (D. Conn. 2010) (deeming the "practical likelihood" that a vehicle
will be moved irrelevant under the automobile exception and applying the exception even
though it was "unlikely" for the actual owner of a vehicle to have attempted to remove it from
police custody (citing Howard, 489 F.3d at 493-94, regarding "practical likelihood")).
145. See Labron, 518 U.S. at 940.
146. See United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 509 (6th Cir. 2001) ("Since California
v. Carney . . articulated an additional justification for warrantless car searches, namely that a
car's occupants have a lesser expectation of privacy in their car than in their home due to our
society's pervasive regulation of automobiles, the necessity of a special exigency has
waned.").
147. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976)).
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seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects."' 4 8
Moreover, a vehicle "travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants
and its contents are in plain view"1 49 such that "[t]he expectation of privacy as
to automobiles is ... diminished by the obviously public nature of automobile
travel." 5 o For these reasons, the primary rationale for the automobile
exception today is that expectations of privacy in automobiles are diminished
relative to the home, an important step for making certain "vehicles"
including motor homes and perhaps even tiny houses on trailers, particularly
those that are classified as RVs-subject to the automobile exception.
B.

The Automobile Exception Applied to Motor Homes, Trailers, and
RV

Given the distinction between homes (which enjoy the full protection of a
warrant) and vehicles (which may be searched without a warrant due to a
reduced expectation of privacy), it was only a matter of time before the Court
had to determine whether a motor home should be treated similarly to homes
or vehicles for Fourth Amendment purposes. The Court decided that issue in
Californiav. Carney.151

In Carney, San Diego police received information that Defendant Charles
Camey was using his Dodge Mini Motor Home to exchange marijuana for
sexual favors.1 52 At the time of their investigation, Carney's motor home was
parked near a downtown courthouse where a warrant could have been
obtained.1 53 Police put the motor home under surveillance and within minutes
observed a youth enter the vehicle, leaving shortly thereafter with
marijuana. 154 The youth then informed the officers that he received the drugs
in exchange for sexual contacts.' 5 5 At that time, the officers had no indication
the motor home was about to depart.1 56 Nevertheless, without a warrant,
police entered Carney's motor home, searched it, and seized drugs inside. 15

148.
U.S. 583,
(1991).
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977) (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
590 (1974) (plurality opinion)), abrogatedby California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565
Id.
Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368.
Carney, 471 U.S. 386.
Id. at 387-88.
Id. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 388.
Id.
Id. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 388.
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After Carney was charged with possession of marijuana for sale, he
moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the motor home. 5 s Carney's
motion was denied, leading to his conviction.1 59 However, the California
Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the expectations of privacy in a motor
home are akin to those in a dwelling because the primary function of a motor
home is not transportation but rather to "provide the occupant with living
quarters."1 60 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
that decision. 161
Despite recognizing that Carney's vehicle "possessed some, if not many
of the attributes of a home," the Court declared that "[w]hen a vehicle is being
used on the highways, or if it is readily capable of such use and is found
stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes[,] ... the two
justifications for the vehicle exception come into play"-i.e., ready mobility
and reduced expectations of privacy making the exception applicable.1 62 "At
least in these circumstances," the Court declared, "the overriding societal
interests in effective law enforcement justify an immediate search before the
vehicle and its occupants become unavailable."1 63
The most important aspect of Carney for the tiny house movement is the
fact that the Carney motor home, although not on the highway, was "so
situated that an objective observer would conclude that it was being used not
as a residence, but as a vehicle."1 64 In footnote three of its opinion, the Court
suggested that the outcome might change in a scenario involving a "motor
home that is situated in a way or place that objectively indicates that it is being
used as a residence," and listed "factors that might be relevant" to the analysis
to include the vehicle's "location, whether the vehicle is readily mobile or
instead, for instance, elevated on blocks, whether the vehicle is licensed,
whether it is connected to utilities, and whether it has convenient access to a
public road."1 65 In a similar passage, the dissent suggested additional factors
separating mobile homes from permanent structures, including "whether the
home is moving or at rest, whether it rests on land or water, the form of the

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id
Id. at 388-89.
People v. Carney, 668 P.2d 807, 812 (Cal. 1983).
Carney, 471 U.S. at 389.
Id at 392, 393.
Id at 393.
Id
Id at 394 n.3.
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vehicle's attachment to its location, its potential speed of departure, its size
and capacity to serve as a domicile, and its method of locomotion."1 66
Carney was decided in 1985, leaving more than thirty years for lower
courts to distinguish vehicles objectively serving as residences and those that
serve more of a vehicular function.1 67 Although many vehicles "possess[] ...
attributes of a home,"1 68 the primary factor courts consider in these cases is
whether an objective observer would view the structure at issue as being used
as a residence or as a vehicle. 169 Given the capacity for some vehicles to serve
both functions (like the motor home in Carney), the lines are not always clear,
but as a structure becomes more "readily mobile," the automobile exception
will more likely apply. With these principles in mind, the remainder of this
Section considers cases applying Carney to searches of motor homes, RVs,
and trailers.
1.

MotorHome and R V Searches

As a class of vehicle, motor homes and RVs are essentially the same,
given that each are designed to provide temporary living quarters for
70
recreational, camping, or travel use.o
For Fourth Amendment purposes,
cases involving motor homes and RVs are fact-specific and have led to
different outcomes under the automobile exception.
In United States v. Hamilton,'7

an exemplary case,1 72 the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals considered whether the automobile exception applied to a

166. Id. at 399 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 386.
168. Id. at 393.
169. See United States v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523, 1529 (10th Cir. 1993) (deeming the
critical question under Carney as whether the vehicle at issue is "so situated that an objective
observer would conclude that it was being used not as a residence, but as a vehicle").
170. See FLA. STAT. § 320.01(1)(b) (Supp. 2017) (delineating eight types of "recreational
vehicle-type unit[s]," including the "motor home," that are designed to provide temporary
living quarters).
171. 792 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1986).
172. Numerous cases exist. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 338 F. App'x 736 (9th
Cir. 2009) (applying the automobile exception to two motor homes parked at a public
campground due to "objective indications that [the defendants] were using the motor homes as
vehicles," including that the motor homes were readily mobile, as evidenced by the fact that
they had been driven to and from the campground, were not elevated on blocks, were not
attached to utilities, and were licensed, as well as the fact that the campsite where they were
parked was adjacent to a public road); United States v. Markham, 844 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1988)
(applying the automobile exception to a motor home bearing Tennessee license plates parked
in a driveway in Ohio); United States v. Bertram, No. CR-07-10-JHP, 2007 WL 1375576, at
*3 (E.D. Okla. May 3, 2007) (rejecting the defendant's argument that police violated the
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motor home located in a private residential driveway and connected to a
residence by an extension cord.1 73 Applying the factors from Carney's
footnote three, the court found that the motor home was subject to the
automobile exception because it was readily mobile, as evidenced by the fact
that it had been moved the night before the search; was licensed for travel; and
was located in a residential driveway with easy access to a public road.1 74
Also, although the motor home was attached to "utilities," this factor carried
little weight because an extension cord "is hardly the kind of 'pipe and drain'
connection that would render the motor home more permanent and less mobile
as was contemplated by the Court in Carney."17 5 For these reasons, the court
found that the automobile exception applied.1 76
In United States v. Matteucci, the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon reached the opposite outcome on a motor home search. 7 7
In that case, police stopped the defendants on the highway due to a traffic
violation.' 78 After a consent search of their vehicle turned up weapons,
methamphetamine-related books, and psilocybin mushrooms, the vehicle's
occupants, including Defendant Rodney Griffee, informed the officers that the
defendants were living at a nearby campsite with Defendant Roberta
Matteucci. 179 Suspecting the group was involved in methamphetamine
production, the officers then drove to the campsite where they observed a
motor home and various vehicles. 8 0 Deputy Tom Bergin then knocked on the
motor home's door and engaged Matteucci in conversation, attempting to
obtain Matteucci's consent to search the motor home.' 8' Matteucci initially
declined consent but relented when Deputy Bergin informed her that her baby

Fourth Amendment by searching his RV without a warrant because the vehicle was readily
mobile and probable cause existed to search); cf United States v. Barajas-Avalos, 377 F.3d
1040, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that a travel trailer parked on a farm was not a "home" for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment's open fields doctrine because the defendant used the
travel trailer infrequently as a place to sleep while performing farm chores); Ciampi v. City of
Palo Alto, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1096-97 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (stating that although the plaintiff
had been using his van as a home for several years, the van "would most likely be treated as a
vehicle, subject to lesser protections," because the plaintiffs van was parked on a street,
readily mobile, and registered for use on public roads and highways).
173. Hamilton, 792 F.2d at 843.
174. Id
175. Id
176. Id
177. See 842 F. Supp. 442, 449 (D. Or. 1994).
178. Id at 444.
179. Id at 445.
180. Id
181. Id
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might be removed until Matteucci was cleared of suspicion. 8 2 Deputy Bergin
then searched the motor home, finding incriminating items inside. 83
The defendants later challenged the motor home search, which the
Government argued was justified either by Matteucci's consent or the
automobile exception. 8 4 Regarding the automobile exception, the court
examined both the mobility of the motor home and evidence that it was being
used as a residence, the two primary considerations under Carney.'" The
court first found that the motor home was not "mobile that evening" because it
was "snowed in" in a state park and, to get to a public road, a driver would
have to go down a steep hill and travel several miles in the park. 8 6 Next, the
court found evidence to suggest the motor home was being used as a residence
of Griffee, Matteucci, and their baby. 187 Specifically, prior to the search,
Griffee had informed Deputy Bergin that he was staying at the campsite, and
Matteucci likewise told the officer that the motor home was being used as
their home because they had been kicked out of their apartment.'
Accordingly, the court deemed the automobile exception inapplicable.18 9
Although the Matteucci court arguably focused too narrowly on the motor
home's likelihood of mobility on the particularevening in question,1 90 rather
than the vehicle's inherent mobility, the court's analysis of the motor home's
primary function (residential) was sufficient to resolve the case.191
Significantly for the tiny house movement, some courts go even further than
Matteucci by finding that, even where a motor home is mobile, the automobile
exception does not apply if an objective observer would conclude the motor
home is being used as a residence. 192 A case decided by the United States

182. Id
183. Id at 445-46.
184. Id at 446.
185. Id at 449.
186. Id
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. But see Collins v. Commonwealth, 790 S.E.2d 611, 618 (Va. 2016) (refusing to
decide whether a motorcycle was immediately mobile at the precise moment of the search
because the automobile exception's "bright-line test" for inherent mobility does not require a
court to hypothesize whether it would have been technically possible to flee from the police at
the time of the search; rather, "[t]he mere fact that the stolen motorcycle was 'clearly
operational and therefore readily movable' is dispositive).
191. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394 n.3 (1985) (providing factors for the
vehicle exception).
192. See id. at 393-94, 394 n.3.
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District Court for the Middle District of Florida, United States v. Adams, is
illustrative. 193

In Adams, Defendant Kenneth Adams was arrested outside of his motor
home located in a wooded area of a rural section of Suwanee County,
Florida.1 94 After arresting Adams, officers searched his motor home and
uncovered evidence that allowed them to obtain warrants to search his storage
facilities, where incriminating evidence was found.1 95 Adams later challenged
the search of his motor home, which the Government defended on the basis of
the automobile exception.1 96

Along with the requirement of probable cause, the Adams court read
Carney as requiring the Government to prove both that the vehicle at issue
was readily mobile and that it was objectively being used for transportation.1 97
Despite finding the probable cause and mobility requirements met, the court
found evidence that the vehicle was not being used for transportation but as a
residence.1 98 For example, the court noted that the motor home was located in
a rural area on a private wooded lot, that an electric generator was operating at
the time, and that other vehicles used for transportation were located on the
property.1 99 In addition, personal items, including clothing and food, were
located in the motor home. 200 Also, "the motor home contained a kitchenette,
sink, bed, sofa, and a dining room table." 20' Finally, there was no convenient
access to a public road. 202 Accordingly, even though the motor home was
readily mobile due to its "inherent ability to function," 203 the court found the
automobile exception inapplicable.
Cases involving the warrantless search of RVs, which are structurally
similar to motor homes, 204 have also led to different outcomes depending on

193. 845 F. Supp. 1531 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
194. Id. at 1534.
195. Id.
196. Id (citing Carney, 471 U.S. 386).
197. Id at 1536.
198. Id at 1537.
199. Id at 1536-37.
200. Id at 1537.
201. Id
202. Id
203. Id.
204. See FLA. STAT. § 320.01(1)(b) (Supp. 2017) (defining "motor vehicle" to include
"[a] recreational vehicle-type unit primarily designed as temporary living quarters for
recreational, camping, or travel use, which either has its own motive power or is mounted on
or drawn by another vehicle," and identifying eight "basic entities" that qualify as
"recreational vehicle-type" units, including the "motor home" which is defined as "a vehicular
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the vehicle's perceived primary use. The simplest cases in this line include
those where RVs were pulled over while traveling down the highway, given
that such vehicles are clearly mobile and are undoubtedly being used for
transportation, making them subject to immediate search under the automobile
exception (assuming probable cause exists). 205 Contrary RV cases include
United States v. Briscoe,206 a federal court opinion that, in dicta, deems the
automobile exception inapplicable to an RV parked behind a residence
because the RV was not parked on a public street or in a public area; officers
were able to determine from outside the vehicle that the defendants were
living in the RV; and the RV was not registered or licensed for travel. 207
2.

TrailerSearches

Along with motor homes and RVs, courts have applied the automobile
exception to various trailer searches. An important case on this issue is United
States v. Navas, which involved the search of an unhitched tractor trailer that,
like the tiny house on wheels, is not capable of transportation on its own. 208
In Navas, while investigating narcotics trafficking, police searched a
tractor trailer that had been unhooked from its cab and left in a warehouse. 209
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York limited
the automobile exception to "some type of vehicle that is capable of moving
on its own" and concluded that "[a] stationary trailer, detached from a tractor
cab with its legs dropped[] and stored inside a warehouse[] is not a vehicle that
is readily mobile" for purposes of the automobile exception, particularly since
the cab's drivers were under arrest and the warehouse was surrounded by
agents at the time. 2 10 Accordingly, the district court found the automobile

unit which. . . is a self-propelled motor vehicle . . primarily designed to provide temporary
living quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use").

205. See, e.g., United States v. Zucco, 860 F. Supp. 363, 369-70 (E.D. Tex. 1994)
(applying the automobile exception to a search of an RV that had been pulled over on the

highway).
206. No. 16-10155-EFM, 2017 WL 1908594 (D. Kan. May 10, 2017).
207. Id. at *3 n.43.
208. United States v. Navas, 597 F.3d 492, 497-500 (2d Cir. 2010); see Walker, supra
note 24.

209. United States v. Navas, 640 F. Supp. 2d 256, 260-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), rev'd, 597
F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2010) (describing the events leading to the search).
210. Id. at 267, 268.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

27

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 2
292

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 69: 265

exception inapplicable, 2 1' a decision the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed. 212

In a lengthy analysis, the Second Circuit found two fundamental errors in
the district court's analysis. Most importantly, the district court erred in
limiting the automobile exception to vehicles capable of moving on their
own. 213 Citing the Supreme Court's reference to "wagon[s]" in Carroll,which
are likewise incapable of self-propulsion, the court found it insignificant that
the trailer was disconnected from its cab. 214 In the Second Circuit's view, "the
trailer remained inherently mobile as a result of its own wheels and the fact
that it could have been connected to any cab and driven away." 215
Referencing Carney's footnote three, the court further distinguished a
trailer "with its legs dropped" from a motor home with its wheels "elevated on
blocks." 216 According to the court:
Trailers are routinely parked, legs dropped, with the expectation of
promptly returning them to the road as soon as they have been loaded
or a cab becomes available to haul them. The dropping of the legs in
no way suggests that the trailer will not promptly return to service on
the highways. In contrast, the raising of a motor home onto blocks is
a more elaborate process, less easily undone, which might
"objectively indicate[] that [the motor home] is being used as a
residence" rather than a vehicle. The position of a trailer's legs
conveys no such impression. 217

Accordingly, the court found "no question that the trailer in this case was
being used as a vehicle and not a residence." 218 In addition, the court
determined that the trailer's "inherent mobility" did not change simply
because the arrestees were detained and the warehouse was secured. 2 19
Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment permitted an immediate, warrantless
search.220

211. Id
212. United States v. Navas, 597 F.3d 492, 501 (2d Cir. 2010).
213. Id. at 499.
214. Id. (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925)).
215. Id. (emphasis in original).
216. Id. (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394 n.3 (1985)).
217. Id. (citing Carney, 471 U.S. at 394 n.3).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 500.
220. See id. (reasoning that the Fourth Amendment gave the agents probable cause to
conduct the search).
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Reaching a similar result as the Second Circuit in Navas, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota, in State v. Otto, applied the automobile exception to a
camper that was not hooked to any vehicle, had its landing gear down, and
was connected to power cords at the time of the search. 22' Relying on Navas,
the court determined that although the "camper was not mobile while the
officers were present, it was capable of being mobilized within a very short
time," making it subject to the automobile exception. 222
Cases similar to Navas and Otto include United States v. Ervin, 223 where
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the automobile exception to a travel
trailer attached to a truck and parked in a motel parking lot, whose owners
were staying inside the motel rather than in the trailer; 224 and United States v.
Smith,225 an unpublished opinion of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
applying the automobile exception to an unhitched tractor trailer involved in
distributing illegal liquor.226
In contrast to the aforementioned cases and reminiscent of the Navas
court's distinction between a trailer on blocks and one that is merely parked
"with its legs dropped," 227 the United States District Court for the District of
New Hampshire has ruled, in dicta, that the automobile exception did not
apply to a house trailer situated in a trailer park in a manner objectively
indicating that it was being used as a residence.228 The court emphasized that
the trailer was not readily mobile, even though the truck which towed it was
nearby, because one end of the trailer was elevated on blocks, the trailer was
connected to campground utilities, and it would have taken nearly an hour to
connect the trailer to the truck. 229

In sum, motor homes, RVs, and trailers may or may not be subject to the
automobile exception depending on the precise facts. Because an inherently

221. See 840 N.W.2d 589, 594-95 (N.D. 2013).
222. Id
223. 907 F.2d 1534 (5th Cir. 1990).
224. See id. at 1538-39 (reasoning that the travel trailer met the automobile exception
because it was parked in a parking lot and the owners were not utilizing it as a residence).
225. 456 F. App'x 200 (4th Cir. 2011).
226. Id. at 203, 209 (reasoning that the automobile exception applied because the tractor
trailer was inherently mobile and the recent unloading activity may have suggested it would be
moved after all of the liquor was unloaded); see also United States v. Allen, 771 F. Supp. 2d
752, 760 (W.D. Ky. 2011) (applying the automobile exception to a trailer that was hooked to a
tractor and was being moved along the interstate).
227. See United States v. Navas, 597 F.3d 492, 499 (2d Cir. 2010) (distinguishing a
trailer "with its legs dropped" from a motor home with its "wheels elevated on blocks" (citing
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394 n.3 (1985))).
228. United States v. Levesque, 625 F. Supp. 428, 450-51 (D.N.H. 1985).
229. Id. at 451.
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mobile vehicle triggers the automobile exception's twin rationales, mobility is
critical. 23 0 However, where such a structure is objectively being used as a
residence rather than for transportation, the automobile exception generally
does not apply, regardless of inherent mobility.231 Thus, as Adams
illustrates, 23 2 a structure's primary function residential or vehicular is the
most critical inquiry under Carney.233
V.

COURTS' LIKELY APPLICATION OF THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO TINY
HOMES

Although downsizing to 200 square feet of living space is surely difficult,
perhaps the biggest challenge a tiny home owner will face is finding a suitable
place to live. This is largely determined by zoning laws, such as those in
Walsenburg, Colorado, or Topeka, Kansas, which require tiny homes to be
placed permanently on a footer or foundation and be connected to city
utilities. 23 4 Other municipalities, such as Coconino County, Arizona, permit
tiny homes to be built either on foundations or trailers. 23 5
A police officer who confronts afoundation-built tiny home will almost
certainly view the structure as a "home" for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, at least under the standards articulated in Carney, because a tiny
home on a foundation is not "readily mobile" and is clearly being used for

230. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 392-93.
231. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 394 (stating that the automobile exception "has historically
turned on the ready mobility of the vehicle, and on the presence of the vehicle in a setting that
objectively indicates that the vehicle is being used for transportation"); cf id. at 394 n.3
(refusing to decide whether the automobile exception would apply to a motor home situated in
a way or place that objectively indicates it is being used as a residence).

232. See United States v. Adams, 845 F. Supp. 1531, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (citing
Carney, 471 U.S. at 392-93).
233. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 394 (stating that the automobile exception "has historically
turned on the ready mobility of the vehicle, and on the presence of the vehicle in a setting that
objectively indicates that the vehicle is being used for transportation"); see also United States

v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523, 1529 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Carney, 471 U.S. at 393) (deeming the
critical question under Carney as whether the vehicle at issue was "so situated that an
objective observer would conclude that it was being used not as a residence, but as a vehicle").

234. See, e.g., Walsenburg, Colo., Ordinance No. 1045 (Sept. 2, 2014), http://docs.wix
static.com/ugd/ 1615ec_3abcddOd5b964a4daOdd22eb33976bf7.pdf (requiring that a singlefamily detached dwelling be placed permanently on a footer or foundation and tapped into the
city's water and sewer system separately from any other structure or use on the premises);
Moore, supra note 94 (noting the requirement of a permanent foundation and connections to
sewer, water, and electric utilities in Topeka County).
235. COCONINO, supra note 98.
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residential purposes.26 An officer whose investigation leads him to a tiny
home on wheels, however, would face a much more difficult analysis.
If a case arises where a tiny house built on a trailer is searched pursuant to
the automobile exception and is subsequently challenged under the Fourth
Amendment, courts might choose to resolve each case according to its unique
set of facts or may instead adopt a categorical rule that treats all tiny homes
alike. Either approach is reasonable. However, the case-specific approach will
have great appeal for courts. First, it is the method adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in Carney, the most analogous case. 23 7 Second, the
case-specific approach will allow a court to resolve only the case before it,
which courts strongly prefer.238 This approach would, in turn, allow courts to
avoid classifying all tiny homes into a single category, residence or vehicle,
which they will hesitate to do. Accordingly, the case-specific approach will
likely become the norm.
A.

Case-Specific Approach

If history is a guide, courts will decide each case involving the warrantless
search of a tiny home on wheels according to its own unique facts, specifically
by applying the factors in Carney's footnote three (or some similar set of
factors). Those factors include the tiny home's location, whether it is readily
mobile, whether it is licensed, whether it is connected to utilities, and whether
it has access to a public road.239
In my estimation, merely applying the Carney factors to the typical tiny
home on wheels without a more critical analysis of the underlying concerns in
that case will almost always trigger the automobile exception. First, the tiny

236. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 394 n.3 (considering factors that might be relevant in
determining when a house will be deemed a residence).
237. See id. (recognizing that "a motor home that is situated in a way or place that
objectively indicates that it is being used as a residence" presents a different issue than the case
at hand).
238. See, e.g., Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 545 (1943) ("We need not
now examine the various situations that were before the Circuit Courts of Appeals in the cases
[involving different circumstances] or consider hypothetical possibilities. We decide only the
case before us and sustain the power of the Board to order reimbursement in full under the
circumstances here disclosed."); Jefferson County v. Acker, 210 F.3d 1317, 1318 n.1 (11th
Cir. 2000) ("Of course, we decide only the case before us, and nothing we say in this opinion
is meant to imply any view on any other issues relating to the Jefferson County occupational
tax."); Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Twp., 89 A.2d 693, 697 (N.J. 1952) (stating that the
question of whether a zoning ordinance is arbitrary and unreasonable "must be answered in the
light of the facts of this particular case").
239. Id.
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home on wheels is, by definition, mobile.240 In addition, as the RV and motor
home cases show, merely connecting a tiny home to utilities would not alter
the home's inherent mobility. 24 1 Also, in some municipalities, tiny homes on

wheels must be licensed for transportation, 242 a further indicator of mobility
per Carney.243 In addition, because a person who opts to live in a tiny home
often does so, at least in part, because of its mobility, the owner of a tiny home
on wheels is unlikely to permanently secure the home to a foundation or
elevate it on blocks but will instead leave the underlying trailer bed in place
and functional. 244 For these reasons, the typical tiny home on wheels would
likely be subject to the automobile exception under the factors articulated in
Carney.
With that said, the Carney factors discussed above are merely a guide for
resolving the underlying issues identified in that case whether the structure
at issue is readily mobile and whether it serves a residential or vehicular
function. 245 These are arguably distinct inquiries that tend to point in different
directions for the tiny home on wheels. If, for example, a court views the
critical Carney issue as whether the tiny house on wheels is inherently mobile,
this would likely trigger the automobile exception. After all, one of the tiny
home's core attributes is its mobility. 246 Under this reading of Carney, the

automobile exception is particularly likely to apply in the event a tiny home
may be moved quickly, such as when it is found attached to a vehicle readily
capable of towing it. 247 The exception might even apply when the tiny home

240. See Walker, supra note 24 (stating that a tiny house on wheels (THOW) is intended
as a full-time residence or year-round rental property and must be built on a trailer and have
the ability to tow).
241. See supra notes 175-180 and accompanying text; see also Grimley, supra note 75
(reporting that a tiny home on wheels has utility connections similar to those of an RV).
242. See Grimley, supra note 75 (reporting that tiny homes on wheels are classified as
RVs in Washington and must be certified by the state Department of Transportation).
243. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 394 n.3 (proposing factors that may be relevant in
determining whether a warrant would be required to search including whether the vehicle is
licensed).

244. See United States v. Navas, 597 F.3d 492, 499 (2d Cir. 2010) (highlighting this
distinction).
245. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 394 (describing the "two requirements for application of the
exception" as "ready mobility" and "the presence of the vehicle in a setting that objectively
indicates that the vehicle is being used for transportation").
246. See Walker, supra note 24 (stating that a tiny house on wheels (THOW) is intended
as a full-time residence or year-round rental property and must be built on a trailer and have
the ability to tow).

247. Cf United States v. Levesque, 625 F. Supp. 428, 451 (D.N.H. 1985) (finding, in
dicta, that the automobile exception would not apply to a trailer situated in a trailer park and on
a lot, objectively indicating that it was being used as a residence, and noting that "although the
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on wheels is found stationary, unconnected to a vehicle capable of towing it.
As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, "[e]ven where there is little
practical likelihood that the vehicle will be driven away, the exception applies
at least when that possibility exists." 248 Moreover, although a core feature of
the tiny home on wheels is that it cannot move under its own power, 249 this
does not necessarily render the automobile exception inapplicable, as
illustrated by Navas which applied the automobile exception to a tractor trailer
disconnected from its cab. 25 0 Thus, if a court were to follow the reasoning of
Navas, the typical tiny home on wheels would almost certainly satisfy the
automobile exception's mobility requirement, leaving only an officer's
determination of probable cause as a barrier to a warrantless search.
Yet, this is not the end of the analysis under Carney. As the Court in that
case instructs, if an objective observer would believe a tiny home-even one
on a trailer-is being used as a residence, the automobile exception should not
apply.251 This would almost certainly be true of tiny homes built on
foundations and could likewise apply to most tiny homes on wheels, which, by
definition, are intended as full-time residences.252 By contrast, motor homes,
which are often subject to the automobile exception per Carney, are utilized in
ways different than the tiny home. For example, a motor home might be used
for business purposes; it may serve as one's primary mode of transportation;
or it could be used for taking vacations to remote destinations. 253 Unlike tiny
homes, motor homes are usually not permanent residences. 25 4 Because of their

truck which tows the trailer was only a few feet from the trailer, the trailer was not readily
mobile in light of the fact that one end of the trailer was elevated on blocks and that the trailer
was connected to utilities at the campground, and also because of the three quarters of an hour
lead time to connect the trailer to the truck").
248. United States v. Howard, 489 F.3d 484, 493 (2d Cir. 2007).
249. Walker, supra note 24.
250. See United States v. Navas, 597 F.3d 492, 499 (2d Cir. 2010) (reasoning that though
the trailer remained disconnected from the cab, it remained inherently mobile due to its own
wheels).
251. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394 (1985) (describing the "two
requirements for application of the exception" as "ready mobility" and "the presence of the
vehicle in a setting that objectively indicates that the vehicle is being used for transportation").
252. Walker, supra note 24.
253. United States v. Kinney, No. 4:05CR00280ERW, 2005 WL 3213909, at *2 n.4
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 30, 2005).
254. See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 415 F. Supp. 2d 769, 773
(N.D. Ohio 2006) (finding no requirement under Florida law that a motor home be used as a
permanent residence); see also FLA. STAT. § 320.01(1)(b) (Supp. 2017) (defining "motor
vehicle" to include "[a] recreational vehicle-type unit primarily designed as temporary living
quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use, which either has its own motive power or is
mounted on or drawn by another vehicle" and identifying eight "basic entities" that qualify as

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

33

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 2
298

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 69: 265

more obvious residential function, tiny homes are more likely to invoke the
residential use highlighted in Carney, making their inherent mobility much
less significant than the Dodge Mini Motor Home in that case. 255 Accordingly,
if a court were to apply the Carney framework, the result would largely
depend on whether the court views mobility or primary function as
dispositive.
B.

CategoricalApproach

A wholesale alternative to the Carney framework is a bright-line rule that
treats all tiny homes, whether on foundations or on wheels, as Fourth
Amendment "houses" rather than vehicles. The rationale of this approach is
simple. Carney effectively adopted a presumption that a motor home, due to
its ability to be quickly moved at the turn of an ignition key, should be treated
as a vehicle under the Fourth Amendment. 256 This makes sense. A motor
home, after all, is built for transportation, having all the capabilities of any
other vehicle while supporting only temporary residency. The opposite is true
for a tiny house, which is incapable of transportation on its own and is built to
serve as a permanent residence. Accordingly, Caney's underlying
presumption should not apply to the typical tiny home on wheels. For these
reasons, I propose that essentially all tiny homes, including those on trailers,
be entitled to the protections afforded to the home. This result can be reached
either under the Carney framework (by prioritizing residential function over
inherent mobility) or under a bright-line rule that treats the tiny home on
wheels for what it truly is a home.

"recreational vehicle-type" units, including the "motor home" which is defined as "a vehicular
unit which. . . is a self-propelled motor vehicle . . primarily designed to provide temporary
living quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use").
255. The majority opinion in Carney distinguishes between residential and vehicular use
on at least four occasions. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 393 (noting that although Carney's motor
home "possessed some, if not many of the attributes of a home, it is equally clear that the
vehicle falls clearly within the scope of the [automobile] exception" because, in part, it "was
so situated that an objective observer would conclude that it was being used not as a residence,
but as a vehicle"); id at 394 (declining to distinguish between "'worthy' and 'unworthy'
vehicles which are either on the public roads and highways, or situated such that it is
reasonable to conclude that the vehicle is not being used as a residence"); id. (stating that the
automobile exception "has historically turned on the ready mobility of the vehicle, and on the
presence of the vehicle in a setting that objectively indicates that the vehicle is being used for
transportation"); id. at 394 n.3 (refusing to decide whether the automobile exception would
apply to a motor home situated in a way or place that objectively indicates it is being used as a
residence).
256. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 393.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss2/2

34

McAllister: Go Tiny or Go Home: How Living Tiny May Inadvertently Reduce Priv
2017]

Go TINY OR Go HOME

299

Carney was decided over thirty years ago. While Carney is still the law, it
may be time to rethink that decision, particularly as it pertains to the tiny home
on wheels. Stepping out of Carney's restrictive framework, the most striking
feature of the tiny home on wheels is not that it is capable of being moved, but
rather that it is a home. Over and over, the Supreme Court has emphasized the
core of the Fourth Amendment as the right of an individual to retreat into his
home and there be free of unreasonable government intrusion.25 7 As the Court
has noted, "[a] sane, decent, civilized society must provide some such oasis,
some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave,
some inviolate place which is a man's castle." 258 These principles apply as
equally to the home resting on wheels as to the home resting on a cement
foundation. In addition, many tiny home owners choose to place their homes
on wheels, rather than on foundations, not because they particularly desire
mobility, but rather to make their homes lawful under local building codes and
zoning laws. Moreover, no one would ever seriously argue that a person's
Fourth Amendment rights should depend on the square footage of his home, 25 9
but that would be the practical result of a rule that categorizes most tiny homes
as vehicles. Thus, a strong argument can be made to treat all tiny homes alike
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
Even under this proposed bright-line rule, however, there will surely be
cases where the automobile exception should apply to a tiny home. Imagine,
for example, a case where police suspect a person is using a tiny home on
wheels to manufacture methamphetamine, transporting the home from place to
place to evade detection. Police then pull over the suspect as he is towing his
tiny home down the highway, just miles from the state border, and have
probable cause to believe the tiny home contains evidence of the illegal
methamphetamine operation. On these facts, it would be illogical to conclude

257. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("At the very core of the
Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion. With few exceptions, the question whether a
warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no.")
(internal citations and marks omitted); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980)
("[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed.").
258. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 n.4 (1961) (citing United States v. On
Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (2d Cir. 1951)), aff'd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
259. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 407-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("These places [mobile
homes] may be as spartan as a humble cottage when compared to the most majestic
mansion . . .but the highest and most legitimate expectations of privacy associated with these
temporary abodes should command the respect of this Court.").
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that police must obtain a warrant to search the tiny home.2 60 Here, not only is
the tiny home obviously mobile and hence a fleeting target for a search, 26 1 it is

also entitled to a lesser expectation of privacy than the traditional foundationbuilt home, particularly if the home is registered as an RV under the
jurisdiction's motor vehicle laws. 262 Further, if police have reason to believe
the tiny home is being used to manufacture illegal drugs, it would be
reasonable to conclude the home is not being used as a residence, thereby
paving the way to treat the structure as a vehicle. 263 Accordingly, a bright-line
rule deeming the automobile exception inapplicable for every tiny home on
wheels is probably not the best solution. Nevertheless, by making residential
function the core consideration in these cases, a court would go far towards
ensuring that most tiny homes on wheels are protected by the warrant
requirement.
VI. CONCLUSION

The tiny home on wheels is a unique structure. Although undoubtedly
mobile, the tiny home's primary function is residential, and owners of tiny
homes often place their homes on trailers not to make them mobile, but
instead to make them lawful under local building codes and zoning laws.
Accordingly, although the tiny home on wheels serves residential and
transportation functions, it should enjoy the full protections of a warrant.

260. See id. at 393-94 ("[T]o fail to apply the [automobile] exception to vehicles such as
a motor home ignores the fact that a motor home lends itself easily to use as an instrument of
illicit drug traffic and other illegal activity.").
261. See id. at 399 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting factors used to separate mobile
homes from permanent structures, including "whether the home is moving or at rest").
262. See CODE FACT SHEET, supra note 24 (recognizing that some tiny houses are
designed as trailers and in Minnesota can be classified as park models or recreational park
trailers that are on a chassis with wheels, which must be constructed to ANSI standard
(Al19.5) and must display a vehicle identification number (VIN)); cf United States v.
Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 510 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he Supreme Court's reference to the truck's
'ready mobility' [in Labron] was not . . . to demonstrate an 'exigent circumstance,' but rather
to show that when the place to be searched, such as a truck, is associated with a lesser
expectation of privacy than a home, the justification for a warrantless search articulated in
Carney is satisfied provided the police have probable cause.").
263. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 392-94.
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